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Abstract
General intelligence requires open-ended exploratory
learning. The principle of compression progress pro-
poses that agents should derive intrinsic reward from
maximizing \interestingness", the rst derivative of
compression progress over the agent's history. Schmid-
huber posits that such a drive can explain \essential
aspects of ... curiosity, creativity, art, science, mu-
sic, [and] jokes", implying that such phenomena might
be replicated in an articial general intelligence pro-
grammed with such a drive. I pose two caveats: 1)
as pointed out by Rayhawk, not everything that can
be considered \interesting" according to this denition
is interesting to humans; 2) because of (irrational) hy-
perbolic discounting of future rewards, humans have an
additional preference for rewards that are structured to
prevent premature satiation, often superseding intrin-
sic preferences for compression progress.
Consider an agent operating autonomously in a large
and complex environment, absent frequent external re-
inforcement. Are there general principles the agent can
use to understand its world and decide what to attend
to? It has been observed going back to Leibniz that un-
derstanding is in many respects equivalent to compres-
sion.1 To understand its world, a competent agent will
thus attempt, perhaps implicitly, to compress its his-
tory through the present, consisting of its observations,
actions, and external rewards (if any). Any regularities
that we can nd in our history through time t, h( t),
may be encoded in a program p that generates the data
h( t) as output by exploiting said regularities.
Schmidhuber has proposed the principle of compres-
sion progress (Sch09): long-lived autonomous agents
that are computationally limited should be given intrin-
sic reward for increasing subjective \interestingness",
dened as the rst derivative of compression progress
(compressing h( t)). Agents that are motivated by
compression progress will seek out and focus on regions
of their environment where such progress is expected.
They will avoid both regions of the world which are en-
tirely predictable (already highly compressed), and en-
tirely unpredictable (incompressible and not expected
to yield to compression progress).
1Cf. (Bau04) for a modern formulation of this argument.
A startling application of the principle of compres-
sion progress is to explain \essential aspects of subjec-
tive beauty, novelty, surprise, interestingness, attention,
curiosity, creativity, art, science, music, jokes", as at-
tempted in (Sch09). The unifying theme in all of these
activities, it is argued, is the active process of observ-
ing new data which provide for the discovery of novel
patterns. These patterns explain the data as they un-
fold over time by allowing the observer to compress it
more and more. This progress is explicit and formal in
science and mathematics, while it may be implicit and
even unconscious in art and music. To be clear, engag-
ing in these activities often provides external rewards
(fame and fortune) that are not addressed here; we con-
sider only the intrinsic rewards from such pursuits.
Rayhawk (Ray09) criticizes this attempt with a
gedankenexperiment. First, generate a (long) sequence
of 2n bits with a psuedorandom number generator
(PRNG) using an unknown but accessible random seed,
n bits long. Assuming that the PRNG is of high qual-
ity and our agent is computationally limited, such a
sequence will require (2n) bits to store. Access the
random seed, and use it to recode the original 2n bits
in (n) space by storing just the seed and the constant-
length PRNG code. This will lead to compression
progress, which can be made as large as we would like
by increasing n. Of course, such compression progress
would be very uninteresting to most people!
The applicability of this procedure depends crucially
on two factors: 1) how the complexity of compres-
sion programs is measured by the agent, namely the
tradeo between explanation size (in bits) and execu-
tion time (in elementary operation on bits); and 2)
which sorts of compression programs may be found by
the agent. Consider an agent that measures compres-
sion progress between times t and t + 1 by C(p(t);h(
t+1)) C(p(t+1);h( t+1)) (see (Sch09) for details).
Here p(t) is the agent's compression program at time t,
and C(p(t);h( t+1) is the cost to encode the agent's
history through time t + 1, with p(t). If execution time
is not accounted for in C (i.e. cost is simply the length
of the compressor program), and p may be any primi-
tive recursive program, the criticism disappears. This is
because even without knowing the random seed, O(n)bits are sucient to encode the sequence, since we can
program a brute-force test of all possible seeds with-
out incurring any complexity costs, while storing only
a short prex of the overall sequence. Thus, the seed
is superuous and provides no compression gain. If ex-
ecution time has logarithmic cost relative to program
size, as in the speed prior (Sch02), then learning the
seed will provide us with at most a compression gain
logarithmic in n. This is because testing all random
seeds against a prex of the the sequence takes O(n2n)
time, so C(p(t);h( t + 1)) will be about n + log(n),
while C(p(t + 1);h( t + 1)) will be about n.
Thus, such pathological behavior will certainly not
occur with a time-independent prior. Unfortunately,
the compression progress principle is intended for pre-
cisely those computationally limited agents with time-
dependent priors, that are too resource-constrained to
brute-force random seeds. A reasonable alternative is to
posit an a priori weighting over data that would assign
zero utility to compression progress on such a sequence,
and nonzero utility to compression of e.g. knowledge
found in books, images of human faces, etc. This gives
a principle of weighted compression progress that some-
what less elegant, but perhaps more practical.
A very dierent theory that also addresses the pe-
culiar nature of intrinsic rewards in humans is hyper-
bolic discounting, based on long-standing results in op-
erant conditioning (Her61). In standard utility theory,
agents that discount future rewards against immediate
rewards do so exponentially; an expected reward occur-
ring t units of time in the future is assigned utility rt
relative to its present utility of r, where  is a constant
between 0 and 1. The reason for the exponential form is
that any other function leads to inconsistency of tempo-
ral preferences; what the agent prefers now will not be
what it prefers in the future. However, considerable em-
pirical evidence (Ain01) shows that humans and many
animals discount future reward not exponentially, but
hyperbolically, approximating r(1 + t) 1. Because of
the hyperbolic curve's initial relative steepness, agents
discounting according to this formula are in perpetual
conict with their future selves. Immediately available
rewards can dominate decision-making to the detriment
of cumulative reward, and agents are vulnerable to self-
induced \premature satiation", a phenomenon that is
nonexistent in exponential discounters (Ain01). While
an exponential discounter may prefer a smaller sooner
reward (when  < 1), this preference will be entirely
consistent over time; there will be no preference rever-
sal as rewards become more imminent.
Hyperbolic discounting and the compression progress
principle intersect when we consider activities that pro-
vide time-varying intrinsic rewards. They conict when
rewards may be consumed at varying rates for varying
amounts of total reward. Consider an agent examin-
ing a complex painting or sculpture that is not instan-
taneously comprehensible, but must be understood se-
quentially through a series of attention-shifts to various
parts. Schmidhuber (Sch09) asks: \Which sequences
of actions and resulting shifts of attention should he
execute to maximize his pleasure?" and answers \Ac-
cording to our principle he should select one that maxi-
mizes the quickly learnable compressibility that is new,
relative to his current knowledge and his (usually lim-
ited) way of incorporating / learning / compressing new
data." But a hyperbolically discounting agent is inca-
pable of selecting such a sequence voluntarily! Due to
temporal skewing of action selection, a suboptimal se-
quence that provides more immediate rewards will be
chosen instead. I posit that the experiences humans nd
most aesthetically rewarding are those with intrinsic re-
ward, generated by weighted compression progress, that
are structured to naturally prevent premature satiation.
In conclusion, I posit two major qualications of the
applicability of the principle of compression progress to
humans. First, that the value of compression progress
is weighted by the a priori importance of the data that
are being compressed. This is most obvious in our in-
terest in faces, interpersonal relations, etc. Even more
abstract endeavors such as music (Mit06) and mathe-
matics (LN01) are grounded in embodied experience,
and only thus are such data worth compressing to be-
gin with. Second, that experiences that intrinsically
limit the \rate of consumption" of compression progress
will be preferred to those requiring self-regulated con-
sumption, even when less total reward is achievable by
a rational agent in the former case than in the latter.
AGI designers should bear these caveats in mind when
constructing intrinsic motivations for their agents.
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